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IAC-D-100/12
24 May 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 100-4-55:

Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan,

published 16 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 100-4-55, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan," published 16 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 22 May 1956 (IAC-M-240, 22 May 1956, item 7 c).

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[redacted]

Secretary

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1. We believe that the statements in NIE 100-4-55 concerning Chinese Communist objectives with respect to Taiwan remain valid. Information currently available tends to confirm the estimates of Chinese Communist military strengths and trends in capabilities.

2. Although it was estimated correctly that the Communists would not attack Taiwan, events have not borne out the predictions that "the Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these groups" or that "they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion."

3. The estimate generally under-rated the willingness of the Chinese Communists to proceed cautiously and gradually toward their objectives in the Taiwan Straits. It failed to anticipate the shift in emphasis from military pressure to diplomatic and psychological means which occurred almost coincidentally with publication of the estimate.

4. The sections of the estimate dealing with reactions to certain possible US courses of action have not been tested.

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